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Introduction
The Saluda and Reedy Rivers flow through a 746,857 acre1 watershed in the northwest portion
of South Carolina (Figure 1 below). The upper portion of the Saluda-Reedy watershed includes the cities
of Easley, Greenville, Mauldin, and Simpsonville. The lower portion of the watershed has a rural
character with more land in forests and agricultural uses. Parts of seven South Carolina counties –
Abbeville, Anderson, Greenville, Greenwood, Laurens, Newberry, and Pickens – comprise the
watershed. The watershed contains approximately 1,439 miles of streams2 and terminates in Lake
Greenwood, an 11,400 acre lake used for recreation and water supply in Greenwood County. According
to the 2000 Census, there were 318,199 persons in the watershed (Table 1 below).
Situated in the rapidly expanding Upstate region of South Carolina, the watershed has
experienced increased population growth and economic development in recent decades, with more
predicted in the near future (Table 2 and Figure 2 below).3 With continued growth and development,
point and non-point source effluent loads in the Saluda-Reedy watershed have also increased, placing
greater environmental stress on the surface waters of the system. Nutrient effluent has been
particularly challenging in the watershed, with subsequent algae problems and oxygen depletion arising
in Lake Greenwood well documented (McKellar, et al. 2008).
This study examines the feasibility of a water quality trading program for the Saluda-Reedy
watershed in upstate South Carolina specifically targeted at the reduction of phosphorous, a pollutant of
growing concern in the watershed. A market-oriented program for trading emissions of this nutrient
would have many components, including: (1) an in-depth understanding of the phosphorous effluent
problem in the watershed, (2) an agreed nutrient cap, (3) willing buyers and sellers, (4) priced nutrient
reduction, (5) and continuous monitoring and verification of watershed conditions (Mikota 2008). Taken
1

Approximate size
USGS 1:24,000
3
Urban growth predictions from Dr. Jeffery Allen, Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs,
Clemson University.
2
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together, these components are the building blocks upon which an institution for managing phosphorus
trades would be built.
Through an analysis of recent scientific findings and by collecting new anecdotal information
from key watershed stakeholders, this study comments on the first three of these components. The
phosphorous problem in the Saluda-Reedy watershed and the implementation of a nutrient cap are
reviewed, and the views and activities of potential market participants are reported. New information
that this study adds to the discussion concerns the willingness of potential buyers and sellers of nutrient
reduction to trade and the readiness for environmental managers to administer a pollution trading
market.
To this end, the study interviewed key stakeholders with expert information in the Saluda-Reedy
watershed to assess their potential for market participation. Questioning of stakeholders focused on
current water quality enhancing activities, and their opinion of conditions necessary for participation in
a water quality trading market, and the conditions that would prohibit participation. Interviews were
conducted between 2009 and 2010 with representatives from the following agencies and organizations:
the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources, the South Carolina Department of Environmental
Control, the South Carolina Natural Resources Conservation Service, the City of Greenville Engineering
Department, Renewable Water Resources (formerly Western Carolina Regional Sewer Authority), and
Upstate Forever. Their views form a major portion of the present work.
Based on this investigation, an analysis of the feasibility of water quality trading in the SaludaReedy Watershed is made.
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Figure 1. The Saluda-Reedy Watershed
8

Watershed Population
318,199
273,479
247,553
206,711
185,215
164,584
150,230
137,063
124,534
114,963
96,097

Year
2000
1990
1980
1970
1960
1950
1940
1930
1920
1910
1900

Table 1. Population in the Saluda-Reedy Watershed 1900 – 2000
(Based on 2000 US Census block groups. Previous decades were calculated by reducing the 2000 population by the
average growth percentage for the SRW Counties for the previous decade).

County

Population
1970*

Population
1980*

Population
1990*

Population
2000*

Population
2003*

Greenville
Laurens
Newberry
Pickens
Anderson
Abbeville
Greenwood
Total

240,546
49,713
29,273
58,956
105,474
21,112
49,686
554,760

287,913
52,214
31,242
79,292
133,235
22,627
57,847
664,370

320,167
58,092
33,172
93,894
145,196
23,862
59,567
733,950

379,357
69,567
36,108
110,757
165,740
26,167
66,271
853,967

395,357
70,269
36,840
112,859
171,510
26,381
67,503
880,719

Table 2. Population in Watershed Counties 1970 – 2003
(From US Census)
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Figure 2. Predicted 2030 Urban Area in the Saluda-Reedy Watershed, from 1990 Baseline
10

Understanding Water Quality in the Saluda Reedy Watershed
Water quality has generally improved in the watershed of the Saluda and Reedy Rivers since the
1970s, likely due to improved point source treatments (North Wind, Inc. 2007). For at least the last ten
years however, excessive nutrification in the Saluda-Reedy watershed has been under investigation by
the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), with regulatory activities
implemented to address nutrification problems. The Saluda and Reedy Rivers are the major source of
inflow to Lake Greenwood. Impairments to Lake Greenwood attributed to upstream sources have been
documented, with phosphorus pollutants a prominent contributor.
In 1998, SCDHEC completed a water quality assessment report for the Reedy River. Portions of
the river demonstrated adverse affects of nutrification related to phosphorus and nitrogen loading.
Adverse affects from nutrification can manifest themselves in the form of oxygen reduction, fluctuation
in pH levels, and fish kills. SCDHEC therefore includes phosphorus standards for applicable NPDES
permits. The listing of impaired segments of the Reedy River under Section 303 (d) of the Clean Water
Act (Figure 3 below), and the potential development of Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) allowances
for water bodies in the Reedy River watershed were discussed in the water quality assessment report
(SCDHEC, 1998).
In 2001, the Reedy River Task Force, sponsored by the South Carolina Department of Natural
Resources (SCDNR), completed a comprehensive investigation of the critical resources of the Reedy
River. In terms of water quality, the Task Force recommended identifying and disseminating information
on the source and type of contamination affecting the river. Such information can assist the
development and implementation of TMDLs and other water quality management programs.
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Figure 3. Sites Assessed for 303(d) Impairment in the Saluda-Reedy Watershed, 2008
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A 2004 SCDHEC study found several locations in Lake Greenwood that did not meet standards for
Aquatic Life Use Support (SCDHEC 2004). Also in 2004, an analysis of water samples performed by the
Department of Environmental Toxicology at Clemson University indicated that the Reedy River
contributed higher concentrations of nutrients into Lake Greenwood than did the Saluda River. It was
hypothesized that this result stems from the abundance of point-source discharges, like wastewater
treatment facilities, along the Reedy River’s course (CUENTOX 2006). During the sample period, average
daily flow in the Saluda River was three times higher than in the Reedy River. It was concluded that
higher nutrient concentrations in the Reedy were balanced by higher flow in the Saluda so that
phosphate loads were approximately equal between the two rivers (CUENTOX 2006). The study points
out that the Saluda drains twice the land area as the Reedy, so with approximately equal loading, the
Reedy River basin contributes twice the nutrient load to Lake Greenwood per unit land area. The study
suggests that this situation is due to the number and volume of point-source discharges in the urbanized
Reedy basin (CUENTOX 2006).
In a study produced in 2005, McKellar, Bulak, and Taylor note that Lake Greenwood provides
drinking water for the Greenwood area, recreational opportunities for residents and visitors, and a
productive fishery. The potential for nutrient inputs from upper tributaries to alter the lake’s water
quality and biotic habitat is discussed (SCWRC 2005). During 2004, McKellar et al. analyzed lake water
samples for temperature, dissolved oxygen, phosphorus, and algal growth. Phosphorus concentrations
in the Reedy and Saluda Rivers were typically found to be above SCDHEC standards for surface waters.
This finding is consistent with the inclusion of the Reedy arm of the Lake Greenwood in the SCDHEC
listing of nutrient-impaired waters. High phosphorus levels were found in both shallow and deep areas
of the lake. Changes in algal growth, related to seasonal changes in light, water temperature, nutrient
levels, and turbidity, were also noted for Lake Greenwood. Seasonal declines in oxygen levels and
increases in water temperature were also found. The study found that by the early summer of 2004,
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sufficiently cool and oxygenated water in the lake had decreased, limiting the extent of high-quality fish
habitat. The study also comments that excessive algal growth can lead to oxygen depletion in lake water
(SCWRC 2005). Three locations in Lake Greenwood did not meet standards for Aquatic Life Use Support
in 2006. They appear on a list of impaired waters caused by excessive total phosphorus concentrations
(SCDHEC 2006).
In 2008, McKellar, et al. produced another study that modeled phosphorus loads, algae
dynamics, and oxygen depletion factors throughout the Saluda-Reedy watershed (McKellar, et al. 2008).
It was found that daily inflow concentrations of phosphorus to Lake Greenwood exceeded the state
standard for piedmont lakes (0.06 mg/L) more than 58% of the time in the Saluda River arm, and more
than 68% of the time in the Reedy River arm. The study points out that excessive phosphorus levels in
lakes can lead to excessive and noxious algal production and oxygen depletion. While 72% of the total
phosphorus load to the lake comes from the Saluda River, excessive phosphorus concentrations come
from the Reedy River (0.11 mg/L) (McKellar, et al. 2008). Modeling performed in the study attempts to
predict the consequences of phosphorus reductions to water and habitat quality in the lake. Phosphorus
load reduction goals could be modeled for policy making purposes using the McKellar at al. work. As an
example, the study suggests that a 50% reduction in the phosphorus load in both the Saluda and Reedy
rivers would reduce phosphorus concentrations to acceptable levels, reduce risks of excessive algal
production, increase oxygen levels, and improve aquatic habitats (McKellar, et al. 2008). A 50%
reduction in the phosphorus load in both the Saluda and Reedy Rivers would reduce annual mean
concentration to levels less than 0.06 mg/L, reduce the risk of algal blooms, decrease the extent of
extreme hypoxia by 31%, and increase the tolerable habitat for striped bass by 10%.
Understanding the source, type, interactions, and impacts of contaminants is critical for designing
effective water quality management programs in the Saluda-Reedy watershed. The preceding research
suggests that both intensive and non-intensive activities in the drainage basins of both rivers contribute
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to excessive phosphorus in the watershed. Point-source discharges in the relatively smaller Reedy River
subwatershed, combined with non point-source discharges in the relatively larger Saluda River
subwatershed, appear to be the major cause of nutrification problems. SCDHEC and SCDNR efforts show
that problematic levels of phosphorus are frequently delivered to Lake Greenwood via both rivers.
Seasonal algal blooms and oxygen reduction in Lake Greenwood have been connected to
upstream phosphorus loads. These water quality impairments have begun to threaten the lake’s
recreational and amenity value. As a source of drinking water, an aquatic habitat, a recreational
attraction, and a valuable public and private amenity, Lake Greenwood provides a variety of ecosystem
and economic services to residents and visitors.
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Policy Options for Water Quality Management
Scientific modeling suggests that by halving the amount of phosphorus introduced into the
watershed, risks to lake water quality can be mitigated (McKellar, et al. 2008). Currently, SCDHEC is
developing Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) guidelines for phosphorus for the Reedy River arm of Lake
Greenwood. A TMDL is the total amount of a pollutant that a body of water can assimilate without
violating state water quality standards. For Lake Greenwood, the TMDL would set the amount of
phosphorous that needs to be reduced. Responsibilities for its reduction would then be assigned to
emitters.
With a phosphorous TMDL in place, a strategy for reducing this pollutant therefore becomes
necessary. Traditional methods of regulating water quality involve the enforcement of a standard, like a
TMDL, by requiring mandatory technological or behavioral choices. This “command and control”
regulatory approach is so called because it provides minimal flexibility in the means of achieving
pollution emissions targets. The requirements of command and control regulatory approaches seek
internalization of the pollutive side effects of the production process. These side effects are often not
accounted for under typical free market conditions. Command and control regulatory approaches have
been very successful in American environmental policy. Great strides have been made in environmental
quality in the United States since the implementation of national regulatory policies in the 1970s.
Command and control regulatory approaches are often criticized however because administration and
compliance can be cumbersome and expensive and lead to an overall loss of efficiency from an
economic and public policy standpoint.
Recently, alternative strategies for attaining environmental quality have emerged that are
viewed by many analysts as more efficient than the conventional command and control regulatory
approach. These “incentive-based” or “market-based” approaches involve the commoditization of
environmental pollution and its trade between emitters in a market. In a pollution trading market,
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emitters with high pollution mitigation costs can purchase pollution reduction from emitters with lower
mitigation costs. Advocates for market-based approaches find that when such techniques are used,
environmental quality is achieved at lower overall costs since participation in a market creates
incentives for efficiency.
In January 2003 the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued rules through
its water quality policy statement to encourage the trading of nutrients and sediments among point and
non-point sources. The policy states that its purpose is “to encourage states, interstates agencies and
tribes to develop and implement water quality trading programs for nutrients, sediments, and other
pollutants where opportunities exist to achieve water quality improvements at reduced costs” (USEPA
2005). In that document the USEPA states that market-based approaches like water quality trading
provide greater flexibility and have the potential to achieve levels of environmental benefits that would
not otherwise be attained under a traditional command and control regime.
By 2004 there were more than 70 water quality trading initiatives in the United States (Breetz
2004). This rise in interest has been noted, but there are still significant obstacles that stand in the way
of many water quality trading approaches. King and Kuch (2003) found in an analysis of thirty-seven
approved trading sites in the United States that only three programs had actually engaged in water
quality trading. At the time, six nutrient trades had occurred, and only one involved a non-point source.
Even with this less-than-ideal performance, there has been considerable interest in extending the
USEPA’s Water Quality Trading Policy to include point source to nonpoint source trades.
Reducing phosphorous in the Saluda-Reedy watershed may be achievable through trades in a
market. However important question remain. How do these markets operate? How are they created
and implemented? What are the benefits, and the costs, of a market for trading in water quality?
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The Water Quality Trading Framework
The USEPA Water Quality Trading Policy is based on the Clean Water Act of 1972, which, in
addition to many other standards, created new definitions for understanding and regulating water
quality, in particular Water Quality-Based Effluent Limits (WQBELs) and Total Maximum Daily Loads
(TMDLs) for water bodies or watersheds (EPA 2006). The Water Quality Trading Policy states that all
requirements of the Clean Water Act must be upheld, but includes some additional regulations for
water quality control through trading. Trading must occur within the watershed or the same TMDL area,
as defined by the USEPA. Continuous monitoring and evaluations are critical to ensure that backsliding
and uncertainty among participants are prevented. Pollutant suitability must be examined before any
trading can occur. Suitability is determined by identifying the pollutant type, assessing the impact of the
pollutant at the discharge points, identifying timing issues of reductions (for example, if seasonal
changes in water flow would affect pollutant levels and, therefore the trading market), and determining
if supply and demand are accurately aligned for the trading market to function (EPA 2006).
According to the EPA’s “Water Quality Trading Training” Presentation in 2006, the trading
program is a “voluntary exchange of pollutant reduction credits” in which credits are units of pollutant
reduction that are typically measured in pounds. Pollutants that are most commonly traded are
nitrogen, phosphorous, sediment, and heat, but there are other possibilities (EPA 2006).
The allocation of credits to be traded is based on the TMDL set for the water body or watershed.
When the TMDL is set, requirements and goals for pollutant discharge are determined for each point
and non-point source. The TMDL is the “cap” in a “cap and trade” program. Another level of the
acceptable amount of pollution, the water quality based effluent limit (WQBEL), is derived for individual
users and potential traders from the TMDL for the watershed. Any pollutant discharges that exceed the
WQBEL must be compensated for with additional credits from another source. A point source acquires
credits if it controls pollution beyond the requirement specified by the WQBEL. A non-point source is
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given credits when it installs the best management practices beyond the required baseline pollutant
levels. The polluter that has exceeded the WQBEL can then purchase these credits from the sources
that have polluted less than the WQBEL requirement to compensate for their additional pollutant
discharge (EPA 2006).
As of 2004, there are five defined types of water quality trading, based on the participants of the
trading program. Intra-plant trading and pretreatment trading involve one specific point source and do
not typically operate at the watershed scale. Point/point, point/non-point, and non-point/non-point
trading programs include multiple pollutant sources and operate within the entire TMDL area
(Leatherman 2004).
In a typical point/non-point trading program the participants are usually point sources, nonpoint sources, a state permitting authority to regulate activity, the EPA, third-party brokers to oversee
the accurate exchange of credits, and conservation organizations that work towards achieving the
pollution reduction goals. Once established, the trading program is driven by state regulation and
governed by local trading rules. Such programs are built on trust between participants, and, perhaps
most importantly, motivated by economics (EPA 2006).
Economics of Water Quality Trading
Water quality trading can be described in economic terms as a “market in which all the sources
of pollution are jointly charged with the task of meeting a water quality goal” (Leatherman, 2004).
Participants are encouraged to reduce pollutant discharges through market signals and control pollution
because it is in their best interest. Unlike the “command and control” approach that tends to impose
similar shares of pollution control on each source, regardless of relative costs to them, water quality
trading can reduce pollution at the lowest possible cost for each source. A properly designed and
implemented trading program will equalize the marginal costs that each participant spends to reduce

19

pollutant discharges (Kerr 2007). Figure 4 below provides a model of how supply and demand may
function in a trading market.

WQBEL

Cost

A

I
II

B

Peak
Marginal
Benefit

Pollution Abatement
Figure 4. Trading Supply and Demand
As Figure 1 shows, pollution abatement can have different costs for different dischargers. Here, the

The curves represent the marginal costs of pollution abatement for Discharger A and Discharger
B. In this situation, Discharger B will continue with pollution abatement practices after they have
reached the WQBEL for their loading until they reach the peak marginal benefit for pollution abatement.
This creates a surplus of pollution abatement, equal to area II, which could be transferred to pollutant
credits. Discharger A must exceed his peak marginal benefit in order to reach the WQBEL, creating a
pollution abatement deficit, equal to area I. Discharger A must accommodate for this deficit in order for
the enterprise to continue. This condition creates the opportunity for a trade. Discharger B can sell his
surplus credits to Discharger A to make up for his deficit. This way both dischargers will continue to
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operate and the environmental quality standards will be met, if not exceeded. Figure 5 below provides a
simplified conceptual model of how pollution credits are earned and purchased.
Buyer’s post-control
discharge (TBEL)

Pollutant Load

Credits needed for buyer
to reach WQBEL

WQBEL

Credits available
from seller

Seller’s post-control
discharge
Figure 5. Water Quality Credit Trading Model

The WQBEL for the watershed or trading area is set by the USEPA or the state authority.
Pollution credits, which are usually an equivalent to pounds of pollutant, are created based on the
WQBEL and the pollutant type. Any source that can reduce its pollutant discharge beyond the WQBEL
will earn the corresponding number of credits. A source that cannot reduce its discharge to the limit
because of financial or technological constraints will have to purchase credits from another source that
has earned credits. This creates an incentive for sources to reduce the pollutant discharge as much as
possible so that they can either earn credits to sell to other sources, or to reduce the number of credits
that have to be purchased to remain in the market. Table 3 presents a simplified conceptual model of
how water quality trading may occur between two dischargers.
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Discharger A
WQBEL = 100
Discharge = 120
Needs 20 credits

Discharger B
WQBEL = 100
Discharge = 50
Earns 50 credits

Purchases 20 credits from Discharger B
Meets WQBEL

Sells 20 credits to Discharger A
Retains 30 credits to sell to another discharger

Total discharge using only WQBELs = 200
Total discharge using trading = 170
Table 3. Water Quality Trading Scenario
Assume the WQBEL for the two dischargers in the watershed is set at 100ppm of a pollutant and
that one credit is established as the equivalent to 1ppm of that pollutant. Discharger A has been unable
to reduce its loading below the WQBEL and is currently discharging 120ppm, but has decided that
purchasing the technology to reduce its loading by 20ppm is not cost-effective. Discharger B has been
able to use technology to reduce its loading to 50ppm. Discharger A must buy 20 credits to meet the
WQBEL, a less expensive option than purchasing the necessary technology to make the reduction.
Discharger B has earned 50 that it can sell to other dischargers. Discharger A can buy 20 of Discharger
B’s credits to meet the WQBEL.
Although Discharger A is producing loadings above its WQBEL, Discharger B is incentivized to
reduce his loading as much as possible and the combined discharge on the system is lower than if each
discharger were only meeting its WQBEL. Without the trading mechanism, the two dischargers would
likely have spent the least amount of money to meet the WQBEL and discharged a total of 200ppm into
the water system. Within the trading framework, where incentive exists to reduce loadings as much as
possible to earn sellable credits, the total discharge is 170ppm. There may also be overall cost savings in
this scenario. If Discharger A is unable to purchase the technology necessary to reduce his loading he
may be unable to continue operations under the traditional regulatory structure. By trading, Discharger
22

B is able to cost-effectively reduce his loadings as much as possible and transfer the surplus to cover
Discharger A’s excess.
If Discharger A had needed 60 credits instead of 20, then it would have had to purchase 10
additional credits from another discharger in the market that had earned credits. If there is not another
discharger that has earned credits and there are fewer available credits to be sold in the market than
are needed for purchase, the market and the water quality trading program will fail.
Creation of a Market for Water Quality Trading
There are several trading models on which a new market might be based:






Commodity market: credits are fully transferable and can be sold by any credit holder to any
source in the market that must purchase credits to compensate for pollution. Commodity
markets incentivize participants to achieve pollutant levels below required standards to earn
more credits that can be sold to other participants.
Contractual market: credits are not directly transferable but are exchanged in a specific
agreement between the producer and the user of the credits because the credits are, for one of
a variety of reasons, not directly comparable. Credits are earned by reducing pollutant loadings
beyond required standards, so the incentive for participants to lower discharges as much as
possible still exists.
Funded market: monetary credits are deposited by sources that exceed their loading allocations
into a government-regulated fund in the form of a pollution tax. The fund is then used to pay
for loading reductions from that and other sources exceeding their allocations (Leatherman,
2004).

Participants in the new market are free to find the most cost-effective method of lowering their own
and the total pollutant load, given the market’s operating rules and with guidance and monitoring by
state and federal agencies. The market functions because there is a range of costs for lowering pollution
for the individual sources, which forces the participants to buy and sell credits for pollution discharges.
As shown in Figure 4, participants with higher pollution reduction costs or the inability to lower their
pollutant discharge can purchase pollution credits from participants with lower pollution reduction costs
or that have controlled their pollutant discharge beyond what is required.
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The success of the trading program also depends on having enough buyers and sellers in the
market to keep it operating. Without enough participants, insufficient credits will be generated to
compensate for excess pollutants and the market will fail. There must be large enough cost differentials
between potential buyers and sellers to generate enough available credits and a need for those credits.
This may be an important aspect of potential markets for phosphorus in the Saluda-Reedy Watershed
(Mikota 2007).
A final important component of the water quality trading market is trade ratios, which ensure
that the pollutant reductions that result from trading have the same effect as the pollutant reductions
that would result from regulatory approaches without trading. The ratio is the amount of pollutant
reduction from trading in proportion to the amount of pollutant reduction that would need to be
achieved by a treatment facility through technology upgrades. For example, a trade ratio of 3:1 means
that a particular trade would have to remove three pounds of a pollutant for the treatment facility to
receive credit for one pound of pollutant reduction. Trade ratios in a trading market could be based on:







Location of the sources relative to downstream areas of concern
Delivery distance between the buyer and seller if the trade is to meet permit requirements
Uncertainty of nonpoint source reductions
Equivalency of different forms of the same pollutant, such as biologically available phosphorous
and bound phosphorous
Retirement or additional water quality improvement (EPA 2008)

A trade ratio acts as a margin of error that decreases uncertainty among participants and ensures that
improvement occurs. Traders that are similar in nature or more closely located will have greater
certainty that the intended water quality improvement will occur through trading (Leatherman, 2004).

Water Quality Trading Benefits
For many participants in water quality trading programs, the primary benefit to them is
financial. The program is not only flexible in its requirements of the participants, but also reduces
pollution in an equally or more cost-effective manner for the polluters than traditional “command and
24

control” regulatory methods. Buyers have to spend less to purchase credits for pollution compensation
than they would to achieve the same overall reduction in pollution by upgrading technology or altering
the participant’s operations to reduce pollution. In 2001 the EPA estimated that $900 million in
pollution control costs could be saved annually by implementing market-based pollution trading
programs to replace the “command and control” approach. Market incentives also encourage the
development and use of innovations in pollution reduction technology (Leatherman 2004).
In addition to cost savings, water pollution reduction goals are also met. Permits are only issued
for environmentally beneficial uses, which means that greater overall pollution reduction is possible
than through regulatory methods. There is also an incentive for sources to reduce their pollutant
discharge beyond the required limit in order to earn credits to sell to other sources. In the process, the
participants will create a dialogue among themselves and other stakeholders that will build trust and
social capital that will further encourage meeting the program’s goals (Leatherman 2004).
Water Quality Trading Drawbacks
Despite the apparent benefits, water quality trading does have limitations and costs. A trading
program can be complex and difficult to organize and implement. Such is often the case because it is
difficult to create a market in which participants can easily find information, engage in negotiations, and
structure enforceable agreements. A great deal of monitoring is also required for the market to
succeed. The administering authority must provide information, verify agreements, monitor
implementation, and evaluate results.
Market-based approaches to pollution control cannot directly substitute traditional regulatory
approaches since the major aspects of the water quality market are determined by authoritative
regulatory requirements. Regulatory inputs such as legislation, institutional support, monitoring, and
enforcement are necessary for the market to succeed. In this way the trading program should not be
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viewed as a replacement for regulation, but rather as a supplementary tool for use in watersheds to
meet or exceed regulatory requirements (Mikota 2007).
The created trading market can also fail because it is an artificial framework for reaching
pollution reduction goals. If the scarcity of clean water and the damaging effects of the pollutant are
not reflected in the regulatory guidelines or in the market framework, compliance incentives and noncompliance penalties may be too low to drive an effective market. A weak market can also be
vulnerable to external stakeholder demands and political influences that distract from the goal of
pollution reduction (Mikota 2007).
Finally, water quality trading is still a new idea in water pollution management, which may deter
potential new participants. This skepticism and uncertainty may contribute to the slow start and
typically low levels of trading seen in existing water quality markets (EPA 2006).
Water Quality Trading at the Watershed Scale
The watershed is the most suitable level at which to implement a water quality trading program
because all waters within its boundaries are connected and pollutants can potentially flow between all
of these water bodies. Most data about pollutant levels beyond an individual water body are for the
entire watershed, which makes the preliminary research for a trading program more accessible and
complete. Because a watershed is such a dynamic and complex system with multiple uses, however,
costs and benefits in water quality are unevenly distributed, making it difficult to design a market. This
is one reason that most water quality control is done at the sub-watershed level, since sub-watersheds
are smaller and are usually less dynamic than entire watersheds. Collective action by all polluters of the
watershed is necessary to ensure the greatest chance of pollutant reduction, especially because the
hydrologic linkages may cause the actions of one user to negatively impact another. A market-based
trading framework requires involvement of and cooperation between users and will therefore alleviate
some of these effects on other users. Accommodating all of the stakeholders may make establishing
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and implementing a trading framework more difficult, but it will increase the odds of achieving water
pollutant reduction goals (Kerr 2007).
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Water Quality Trading in the Saluda-Reedy Watershed:
The View of Key Market Participants
For a water quality trading program to be viable, key stakeholders in the Saluda-Reedy
watershed must be identified and their interest in participation in a water quality trading program
assessed. At present, the interest of the regulated community within the Saluda-Reedy watershed for a
water quality trading program is unknown. Below is an in-depth account of the potential for water
quality trading in the Saluda-Reedy watershed from two of the largest stakeholders in the system,
SCDHEC, the state water quality regulator, and Renewable Water Resources, the major discharger in the
watershed, are presented below.
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control
Lake Greenwood and the Reedy River are impaired for total phosphorus under Section 303d of
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), which means that SCDHEC must issue a
nutrient Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) limit for total phosphorus in the Reedy River. SCDHEC also
recommends exploring the implementation of limits on total nitrogen in the river. Models are used to
determine the standards for nutrient limits, and create the basis for a TMDL. When nutrient levels
exceed the standards derived from the model, SCDHEC begins to look at the sources of the nutrients to
determine how to manage the contamination. Such a model has been completed for the Reedy River
and SCDHEC is in the process of determining a nutrient level target and management scenarios on the
Reedy River to meet the proposed TMDL. It is difficult to predict the timeline for establishing the TMDL,
but it will hopefully happen within six to eight months (as of October 2009). Once the target and
management scenarios have been determined, SCDHEC will discuss the TMDL with the stakeholders and
dischargers on the river and the Council of Governments (COG). The goal is to work through the COG
and with stakeholders to understand how to divide up the responsibilities for compliance, but the
situation can certainly change between now and when the TMDL is established.
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The TMDL would not address the possibility of water quality trading at this time because this
process does not prescribe implementation strategies for achieving the TMDL. If the dischargers want
to work cooperatively to meet the TMDL, they can and are encouraged to do so. For point sources, each
discharger is permitted and given a waste load allocation based on the TMDL and the discharger must
make changes and implement the necessary technology to meet the waste load allocation.
The Saluda River is not listed as impaired under Section 303d of NPDES so there is not a TMDL
under consideration for that river. However, there are many concerns that the Saluda may reach that
point, so SCDHEC is considering management strategies and waste load allocations on the Saluda to
prevent it from being listed as impaired. Spurred by the work of American Rivers, there is popular
perception that the Saluda River is in trouble. This concern is exaggerated because American Rivers is
likely focused on the potential for the water body to become impaired. That potential is indeed high;
however the river is not impaired right now. Many of the individual loading permits on the Saluda are
also coming up for renewal next year, so the group may be trying to create public support for more
restrictive permits.
There are only two wastewater treatment plants, both managed by ReWa, on the Reedy River.
On the Saluda River there are a few ReWa plants and a few municipal plants. ReWa has been permitted
to trade waste allocation between its two plants on the Reedy, but not between plants on the Saluda
and the Reedy. If waste loads were traded to the Saluda, the contamination may just be moved around
and would still end up in Lake Greenwood. The Reedy River TMDL is only for the Reedy and does not
account for the Saluda. Trading with the Saluda cannot be considered now because it is not within the
scope of the Reedy River TMDL. SCDHEC must consider many other factors that could affect the water
quality of the whole system before thinking about trading between the Reedy and Saluda Rivers.
Trading would also be difficult because the Reedy basin is more urbanized and contains more point
sources, while the Saluda basin is larger but less urbanized.
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In this regard, the MS4 permit for the City of Greenville will help limit stormwater runoff
pollution from the municipality, but the MS4 permitted municipality is only responsible for stormwater
collected through storm sewers and discharged into the river. Direct runoff into the river, for example
from parking lots, is not part of the MS4 permit and is a non-point source, making it difficult to regulate
even with a TMDL. SCDHEC tries to control non-point sources through education and outreach and best
management practices. Dischargers outside of the MS4 jurisdiction have the option to cooperate and
request grant money from the Environmental Protection Agency to improve technology to decrease
loadings. That program is managed by SCDHEC under Section 319 of the Clean Water Act.
There is a possibility for water quality trading in the Saluda-Reedy Watershed, especially
between dischargers on a single river, but it will depend on the cooperation of the dischargers. SCDHEC
could work through the COG to encourage trading, but it will be up to the dischargers to decide if and
how to work together to manage the problem. Most of the TMDLs in South Carolina are for the
management of fecal coli form and there are no trading programs operating for this. SCDHEC is
optimistic that water quality trading could be successful here, but it requires the cooperation of the
dischargers.
SCDHEC has begun discussing the addition of waste loading allocations on the existing NPDES
permits on the Saluda River. Limits on contaminants, including phosphorus, are not currently included
in the dischargers’ permits. SCDHEC has been in contact with ReWa, MS4 permit holders, and the COGs
in the Saluda-Reedy Watershed to discuss the potential for these limitations.
The Saluda is not currently listed as impaired because the phosphorus loading in the river meets
standards. SCDHEC has been monitoring phosphorus levels between Lake Greenwood and Saluda Lake
and has found that most of the dischargers are still operating under their maximum loading limits. As
the Saluda basin becomes more developed and the dischargers are forced to grow, their discharges will
increase and may exceed acceptable levels of phosphorus loadings. SCDHEC is planning to impose limits
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on phosphorus loadings in the Saluda River to proactively keep the dischargers from exceeding the
acceptable contaminant levels. When permits for the dischargers are reissued this year, SCDHEC will
add phosphorus loading limits.
There is the possibility of introducing a total loading permit for the entire river with monthly
loading allocations, instead of individual permits for each discharger. Dischargers would then be
assigned a percent share of the total loading allocation. The focus would then be on mass loading in the
river instead of the individual dischargers’ loadings. The dischargers could allocate loadings as they
chose, as long as the monthly total loading allocation is not exceeded. SCDHEC set a total loading
allocation on two ReWa plants about ten years ago so that they could share their loading limits and it
has been successful. Setting a total limit for several more dischargers may be more difficult, but should
also work well. There would not be any structured market mechanism in place to drive load trading, but
dischargers may make market-driven decisions among themselves about pollution control mechanisms.
An example might be the decision as to which discharger can reduce its loadings with the least cost.
The total allocation permits would be flexible because SCDHEC understands that loadings, and
therefore allocations, will fluctuate. Because most of the dischargers are already discharging less than
the acceptable loading limits, the total loading allocation should not present a problem now because it
would allow more cumulative loading than is currently occurring in the river.
Renewable Water Resources
Phosphorus is a concern in the watershed. Chemically treating phosphorus adds considerable
costs to treatment. In 1981 the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control
(SCDHEC) reported that phosphorus concentrations were a problem in the Reedy River. Since then
phosphorus concentrations have remained the same even though discharge poundage has decreased.
ReWa has established a banking system for phosphorus by allocating poundage between plants in order
to even out contamination levels. This system operates within and between ReWa treatment plants,
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but not with other dischargers in the watershed. There is potential for expanding the trading system,
but there are several factors which restrict or discourage trading for ReWa.
The discharge limits set by SCDHEC pose a difficulty. Trading between ReWa plants located on
different rivers may not be allowed because the poundage limits are different for the Saluda and Reedy
Rivers, and the Reedy River is impaired while the Saluda is not. Costs are also a constraint on treatment
options. Costs increase exponentially as removal efforts increase. It is difficult to place a dollar amount
on a specific amount of removal, so it is difficult to determine how costs will be covered by consumers.
Levels of contamination close to zero are possible, if the high costs of such abatement efforts could be
covered.
Loading poundage limits are based on the size of the discharger and do not allow for growth.
When growth occurs while limits remain constant, the potential for future trading decreases. Every five
years, permits for the plants are renewed and phosphorus limits are usually lowered. This situation
discourages trading because, if point sources agree to help nonpoint sources reach compliance, the
ever-lower standards will make it difficult to accommodate more of the nonpoint source’s loading and
the agreement that they committed to will no longer work.
Another problem for water quality trading is non-point source pollution. Compared to nonpoint sources, ReWa is a greater contributor to loadings during dry weather, but a lesser contributor
during wet weather. The Saluda River is mostly impacted by non-point sources and several small
treatment plants, while the Reedy River has larger point sources. If nonpoint sources could be more
accurately identified and quantified it would be easier to trade.
There are also many locally specific obstacles to water quality trading. For example, there are
specific limits that vary between states, counties, regions, municipalities, and water bodies. If the topdown regulations from SCDHEC were different there would be more potential for trading.
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Total nitrogen is a possibility for trading, but would also be very costly because nitrogen has to
be removed through continuous biological processes. Most nitrogen is also phosphorus driven, so
phosphorus would have to be treated regardless of nitrogen treatment. It is also possible to trade
within the treatment plant itself. Instead of discharging into the river the water is sent somewhere else
for use in another process in the plant.
There are lower total nitrogen requirements in the Reedy River now than there have been
before. Phosphorus can be treated chemically, but total nitrogen is different. Some nitrogen can be
treated with chemicals, but at greater cost relative to phosphorus. There is also a form of nitrogen that
cannot be removed from the water with treatment processes, so it is nearly impossible to reach the low
requirements for total nitrogen. Because it is so difficult to reduce total nitrogen, trading between
nitrogen discharges may be a possibility, but a large participant like ReWa may produce too much
poundage to efficiently trade with other dischargers. Smaller dischargers may have more success
trading between themselves. In addition to the technological difficulty of removing nitrogen, many
sources of nitrogen, such as agricultural and municipal lawn runoff, are non-point, which are more
difficult to identify and address.
Larger dischargers could possibly trade against MS4 permits, but it is unclear what or how they
would trade. SCDHEC believes that point sources are discharging more phosphorus into the Reedy River
than non-point sources. If SCDHEC’s data are correct, it does not appear that the MS4 and nonpoint
source community combined could remove enough phosphorus to offset what is apparently being
discharged by ReWa.4 The overall turbidity load is substantial in the watershed and it is possible that, if
tests were run on turbidity, we would see significant phosphorus levels in that turbidity. During wet
periods, MS4 and non-point sources could be contributing substantial phosphorus in solids, which is not
recognized.
4

However, most of these data were collected during dry weather, which according to ReWa, could distort the
data.
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SCDHEC has suggested that it may place total limits on phosphorus emissions for the Saluda
River in the future. This information has been shared with the phosphorus dischargers on the Saluda.
The limited model that has been examined to this point indicates that the daily limit will probably be
several hundred pounds. Many Saluda River dischargers have therefore begun to discuss load sharing.
The concept is to share higher loadings from one plant with another plant that has lower loadings. In
this way, the sum of all loadings is less than the critical limit set by SCDHEC. Moreover, some
dischargers would be in danger of sanctions when their levels are inhibited by a single overload on the
system that is beyond their control.
Working together as a consortium, dischargers may find greater success in maintaining
phosphorus loadings under the total cap suggested for the Saluda River. Such an arrangement would be
an example of groups working together for an environmental benefit while also reducing the liability
and unnecessary expenses of each group working alone. Each discharger would normally have to spend
more, individually, to maintain limits, but if all dischargers could share a total allowance, then each user
would not have to install all the necessary contaminant reduction technology. Dischargers could reduce
loadings by pooling their technology, and save money overall. Cost and discharge sharing lowers the
chances of noncompliance – the benefit of the market.
In this system, inter-plant trading would emerge with the creation of one cap for total loadings,
instead of the many plant-specific caps. The market’s role is to determine the most cost-effective
method of removing each additional pound of contaminant. With this information, dischargers can
decide among themselves which can remove contaminants at the lowest cost. This cost sharing
technique may also benefit the consumer, who may have to spend less for water services when
dischargers have reduced operating costs.
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Incentive-Based Water Quality Programs within the Non-Point Source Community:
The Activities of Potential Market Participants

There is considerable difficulty for including non-point source water contaminators in a water
quality trading market in the Saluda-Reedy watershed. Identifying sources and verifying their
contribution to both the problem and the solution are obstacles to market participation. However,
incentive-based practices for water quality improvement are not entirely foreign to non-point source
dischargers in the state and the watershed. Two programs, one longstanding one just underway, are
reviewed here and demonstrate the possible benefits of incorporation of non-point source dischargers
in a water quality trading market.
The Environmental Quality Protection Program (EQIP) in South Carolina
The South Carolina Natural Resources Conservation Service (SCNRCS) of the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) manages the Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP) for the
state. EQIP offers cost-share incentives for agriculture and forestry practices that prevent environmental
degradation, including water quality impairment, throughout the state. EQIP is not a tax-based or
market-based program per se, but instead offers cost-sharing to landowners that install better natural
resource protection practices on their land.
The EQIP program involves creating a contract with eligible farmers and foresters to address
resource concerns in cooperation with NRCS. A farmer must provide proof of property ownership and
of an income of less than one million dollars to be eligible to apply for the EQIP contract. A work plan is
created for each contract, based on the specific resource concerns on the property. Contracts are for
three year terms, with the third year devoted to project monitoring and maintenance.
Selected applicants receive funding from NRCS to implement better technology to protect
resource quality on their property. Protection practices include wetland conservation, erosion control,
or other environmental protection activities. Installing resource protection practices not only improves
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environmental quality but also benefits crop and livestock production, the incentive for producers to
participate in the program. Producers save money on installing these practices by cost-sharing with
NRCS. Most producers that apply either do not know how to address a resource concern on their
property, or know how but want to make improvements beyond what they could afford to make alone.
Landowners can be reimbursed up to 75% of the cost of the resource protection practices, not to exceed
$300,000.5
The program is voluntary; interested producers apply annually through a series of national,
state, and local questionnaires that deal with resource concerns and environmental quality on their
property. The questionnaires identify resource protection projects with potential for the greatest
improvements at the lowest cost. Applicants’ projects are funded based on this efficiency indicator.
Efficiency scores and proposed practices are kept confidential in order to keep the process nonbiased.
NRCS typically receives 900 - 1000 applications each year, far more than it can fund. In 2009, projects
applied for totaled $20 million. With only $7.46 million to allocate in 2009, NRCS issued 278 new
contracts, 27% of the total number of applications.
Recent examples of EQIP expenditures for water quality improvement practices in the SaludaReedy watershed include: a 2008 contract for $20, 344.30 to address excessive nutrients in surface
waters on 237 acres in Newberry County, and six contracts in 2009 spanning Abbeville, Anderson,
Greenville, Laurens, Newberry, and Pickens counties to also address excessive nutrients in surface
waters for a total of $306,369.97.6
Mitigating the Impacts to Water Quality of Real Estate Development in Greenville County
In partnership with local government, Upstate Forever, a non-profit environmental conservation
group in upstate South Carolina, has created an incentive-based mechanism for encouraging real estate
development practices that mitigate negative impacts to water quality. The program offers density
5
6

Per the 2008 Farm Bill
EQIP 2008 and 2009, Mr. Bethel Durant, SCNRCS
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bonuses to developers in Greenville County in exchange for implementing low-impact development
practices in their projects. Reducing the amount of impervious surfaces on the project, installing
additional plantings and other landscaping elements, and creating bioretention ponds to hold and treat
runoff waters are examples of development practices that can decrease the quantity and improve the
quality of runoff from development sites.
To participate, developers voluntarily submit their projects for review. The project must meet
predetermined standards concerning its impacts to water quality. The developer also pays into a
restoration fund to be used for county-wide stormwater mitigation projects. Upon successful review and
fee payment, the developer is allowed to build more densely than the Greenville County zoning
ordinances would normally allow. The density bonus enables the production of more saleable lots and
potentially greater profits for the project. Currently, Greenville County’s process for increasing density
requires a public hearing to approve a rezoning of the site. The process can be lengthy with uncertain
outcomes. The Upstate Forever program offers developers a more certainty path to density bonuses.
Specific density targets for the county will be based on the future land use map. The program
will likely be applied in areas where three to six units per acre or higher is the recommended land use. It
is important that developers know from the start what densities are expected from the bonus so they
can decide if participation in the program is in their best interest. After piloting the low-impact
development program in Greenville County, Upstate Forever intends to transfer it to other counties in
the upstate.
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Prospects for Water Quality Trading in the Saluda-Reedy Watershed
Is a market for the trade of water pollution forming in the Saluda-Reedy watershed? This study
indicates a number of important considerations regarding water quality market formation in the system
under investigation.
Increasingly reliable models of the fate and transport of phosphorus and its impacts on water
quality in Saluda-Reedy watershed are being developed. SCDHEC and SCDNR have created such models,
and have shared their results with the scientific and discharging community. These models are helpful in
determining water-quality based effluent limits (WQBEL) in the system.
Water-quality based effluent limits, such as the total maximum daily load (TMDL) under
development for phosphorous on the Reedy River arm of Lake Greenwood, provides the “cap” on the
system that creates a supply and demand of valued water quality credits. With these conditions in place,
trading in units of the scarce water quality resource is further enabled.
When this study began, the level of understanding of and support for water quality trading
among key stakeholders in the Saluda-Reedy watershed was uncertain. The study reveals that (1) a firm
understanding of the fundamental aspects of water quality trading exists among key, would-be market
participants, (2) specified knowledge and opinion regarding the dynamics of a market for water quality
trading in the Saluda-Reedy watershed also exists, and perhaps most importantly, (3) support for water
quality trading among key, would-be market participants in the watershed exists. Indeed, a new piece of
information for this study was the amount of previous reflection on the topic of water quality trading
that has already occurred within SCDHEC and ReWa. These organizations have formulated opinions
regarding the necessary components and processes for water quality trading to function in the SaludaReedy watershed.
In fact, a degree of market-based activity with respect to water quality is already occurring in
the Saluda-Reedy watershed. Instances of market-based efforts directed at water quality enhancement
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can be found in both the point and non-point source discharging community. Inter-organizational
allocations of phosphorus poundage within and between ReWa facilities comprise an important marketbased effort for a point source discharger. This flexibility within the ReWa permit enables more efficient
contaminant treatment.
The search for market-based activity to address water quality concerns also uncovered two
initiatives within the non-point source community. By incentivizing agricultural producers and real
estate developers to implement water quality enhancements in their projects, the EQIP and Upstate
Forever programs demonstrate the capacity for non-point source actors to participate in the provision of
the collective water quality good. While it is unclear whether programs such as these could be folded
into a watershed-wide market for water quality trading between point and non-point dischargers,
theoretically, this possibility cannot be ruled out. Certainly, with proper implementation the
conservation practices of the EQIP and Upstate Forever programs provide water quality improvements.
But obstacles to water quality trading also exist in the Saluda-reedy watershed. These obstacles
have been identified by ReWa, the largest discharger and a key would-be participant in any proposed
market. While ReWa can allocate pollutant poundage within and between its facilities, it cannot do so
between facilities that are located on different rivers, i.e. the Saluda and the Reedy, in the watershed.
Additionally, as the largest point source in the watershed, ReWa can find no complementary point or
non-point source in the watershed with phosphorous reductions on offer. Put another way, there is no
trading partner for ReWa. While there are many other point source dischargers in the watershed,7
individually their potential phosphorous credits in a market would be too small for ReWa to achieve
efficient gains. Moreover, current rules in the watershed not allow for inter-river trading even if suitable
trading partners existed. Finally, ReWa has indicated that as phosphorous limits are lowered with each
permit renewal, offering good-faith phosphorous credits to potential buyers becomes essentially

7

There are 62 NPDES permitted dischargers in the Saluda-reedy watershed, based on SCDHEC GIS data.
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impossible. These issues are related to the problems of sufficient buyers and sellers, and the location
and equivalency features of the trade ratio concept, presented earlier in this report.
An important question therefore becomes: Can other NPDES permit holders, MS4 permit
holders, and/or non-point source dischargers be aggregated in such a way as to serve as a suitable
trading partner for ReWa? At this time, speculation is all that is possible regarding this question.
However, again theoretically speaking, were these other point source and/or non-point source
dischargers able to verify their practices’ contributions to water quality improvement, and be able to
organize themselves into some collective form, the possibility exists that these dischargers, in the
aggregate, could be worthy traders.
Finally, this study forwards the question of whether the advent of new rules governing NPDES
permitted phosphorous loads on the Saluda River could open another avenue for watershed-wide
trading. A river-wide, rather than facility-specific, limit for phosphorous has been proposed. This
condition would offer the needed flexibility for the trade of treatment efficiencies – load sharing –
among Saluda River dischargers. This flexibility does not exist on the Reedy River. Therefore, a related
question forwarded here involves whether, in a future time, Saluda River phosphorous discharge
permit-holders may have the capacity to offer credit to over-limit phosphorous dischargers on the
Reedy River. If so, and if rules and incentives facilitate the securing of such a deal, then a market for
water quality trading in the Saluda-Reedy watershed will be in the making.

40

References
Kerr, J. (2007). Watershed management: Lessons from Common Property Theory. International Journal
of the Commons, 1(1), 89-109.
Leatherman, J., Smith, C., & Peterson, J. (2004). Prepared for the Department of Agricultural Economics’
Risk & Profit Conference: An introduction to water quality trading. Manhattan, KS.
Mikota, G. M., II. (2007). The economic and political feasibility of incorporating wetlands into a water
quality trading program at the watershed scale (Doctoral dissertation, Clemson University, 2007).
Need a 2005 cite for McKellar
McKellar, H., J. Bulak, and B. Taylor (2008). A Dynamic Water Quality Model of Lake Greenwood, SC:
Development and Application toward Issues of Phosphorus Loading, Algae Dynamics, and Oxygen
Depletion. South Carolina Department of Natural Resources, Freshwater Fisheries Research Laboratory,
Eastover, South Carolina.
Saluda-Reedy Watershed Coalition (2005). Watershed Insights Report No. 6: Nutrient-Algae-Oxygen
Interactions in Lake Greenwood. Saluda-Reedy Watershed Coalition with South Carolina Department of
Natural Resources.
Saluda-Reedy Watershed Coalition (2006). Watershed Insights Report No. 7: Nutrient Loading in Lake
Greenwood. Saluda-Reedy Watershed Coalition with Clemson University Environmental Toxicology
Institute.
South Carolina Department of Natural Resources (2001). The Reedy River Report: Managing a
Watershed. South Carolina Department of Natural Resources, Land, Water, and Conservation Division.
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (2004). Watershed Water Quality
Assessment: Saluda River Basin. Technical Report No. 004-04. South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control, Columbia, South Carolina.
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (2006). 2006 State of South Carolina
Integrated Report Part I: Listing of Impaired Waters. South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control, Columbia, South Carolina.
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPAa). (2008). Frequently asked questions about water
quality trading. Accessed September 15, 2009. Available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/tradingfaq.html#11.
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPAb). (2006). Water Quality Trading Training.
Washington, DC.

41

